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STANDARD OF REVIEW FROM DECISIONS
OF THE ONTARIO RENTAL HOUSING TRIBUNAL
PAUL STUART RAPSEY*
RtSUMIt
L'article aborde essentiellement la question de la norme d'examen applicable aux
appels de d6cisions rendues par le Tribunal du logement de l'Ontario en vertu de la
Loi de 1997 sur la protection des locataires interjet6s auprbs de la Cour divisionnaire
de l'Ontario. I1 y a un volume consid6rable de d6cisions contradictoires portant sur la
jurisprudence d'appel sur la question. L'auteur conclut qu'une norme de bien-fond6
devrait s'appliquer aux d6cisions du Tribunal. En outre, il examine bri~vement la
norme d'examen appliqu6e dans les proc6dures de r6vision du Tribunal et dans les
demandes d'examen judiciaire aupr~s de la Cour divisionnaire. Pour ce qui est des
examens effectu6s par le Tribunal, l'auteur conclut que le Tribunal a adopt6 une
d6marche inutilement restrictive.
INTRODUCTION
The issue of what the appropriate standard of review by the courts from decisions of
administrative tribunals should be is an extremely complex one. It has been the subject
of much litigation. As a result, there is a large body of jurisprudence. However, that
jurisprudence is not always consistent or easily reconcilable. Moreover, the context
of one decision is often overlooked and a ratio that is not suited to other contexts is
often adopted without serious analysis. Moreover, the issue has been clouded by the
courts struggling with changing views of public policy. Policy considerations do not
generally lead to sound legal analysis and they often can further obscure the jurispru-
dential thinking on an issue. I
This paper attempts to digest the jurisprudence and to formulate a principle and
conclusion that is or should be applicable to the Ontario Rental Housing Tribunal
[ORHT or the Tribunal]. The Tribunal was established by the Tenant Protection Act,
19972 [TPA]. It operates under the auspices of that Act and the Statutory Powers
Procedure Act 3 [SPPA].
Paul Stuart Rapsey. B.A.. LL. B.. is a research lawyer who has been specializing for more than a
decade in residential tenancy law. He has had several articles published in law journals and has
written a large body of resource material in housing and other areas of law. This article expresses
the personal view of the author.
I This is not intended to underplay the importance or relevance ot public policy considerations per se.
2. S.O. 1997, c. 24, ss. 157-59.
3. R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22.
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JURISDICTION OF THE ONTARIO RENTAL HOUSING TRIBUNAL
I have addressed in detail the scope of ORHT's jurisdiction previously in this publication. 4
The Tribunal is a creature of statute. It only has the authority expressly given to it by
statute. Under the TPA, it is given exclusive jurisdiction to determine all questions of fact
and law in residential tenancy matters arising under its express statutory authority.5 The issue
of what constitutes its "exclusive jurisdiction" is extremely complex and even perplexing; 6
however, I have suggested 7 that by reason of its combined powers under the TPA and the
SPPA, the Tribunal has the same authority the superior courts had under the former Part IV
of the Landlord and Tenant Act 8 [LTA].
THE STANDARD OF COURT REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
DECISIONS
There are two types of court review of decisions of administrative tribunals; namely,
judicial review and appeal. The jurisprudence on the standard of review has arisen
historically in the context of judicial review applications rather than appeals. The Supreme
Court of Canada's jurisprudence has evolved to endorse a pragmatic and functional
approach to determining the proper standard of review for a decision from an administra-
tive tribunal. 9 The Supreme Court has stated that in conducting a review it is always
important to have a clear understanding of the amount of deference, if any, that should be
afforded to the decision of the administrative body.10
4. P.S. Rapsey. "See No Evil. Hear No Evil, Remedy No Evil: How The Ontario Rental Housing
Tribunal Is Failing To Protect The Most Fundamental Rights Of Residential Tenants" (2000) 15 J. L.
& Social Pol'y 163.
5. TPA s. 157(2) and s. 162.
6. In 501606 Ontario Limited v. Manbauhar and Waldman (29 July 1998; Feldman), File No. TSL-
00469 (ORHT), the adjudicator stated that s. 157 simply begged the question of whether something
was within the Tribunal's jurisdiction. In Swire v. Walleye Trailer Park Limited Cunningham v.
Walleye Trailer Park Limited (31 July 2001), Court File Nos. 229/00 and 230/00 (Ont. Div. Ct.)
(Maloney J.), an appeal from a decision of the Small Claims Court. a single judge of the Divisional
Court held that only the ORHT could determine residential tenancy matters, even though the TPA in
this case clearly did not give the Tribunal the authority over the question;, whereas in Crooks v.
Levine, [2001 ] O.J. No. 278, online: QL (Div. Ct.) (Rutherford J.) another judge of the Court reached
the opposite conclusion: i.e., the exclusive jurisdiction provision did not preclude the Small Claims
Court from hearing matters merely because a residential tenancy issue was involved.
7. Supra note 5 at pp 166-69.
8. R.S.O. 1990, c. L.7, Part IV, as rep. by the Tenant Protection Act, 1997, S.O. 1997, c. 24, s. 213(4).
Part IV of the LTA previously dealt with residential tenancies.
9. Moreau-Birube v. New Brunswick (Judicial Council), [20021 S.C.J. No. 9, [Moreau- Berubf] at
para. 37. This was an appeal from a judicial review proceeding of a judicial council's decision. The
decision by Arbour J. succinctly analyzes the developments in the law regarding the standard of
review. See also Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 1
S.C.R. 982, 160 D.L.R. (4th) 193 [Pushpanathan]; Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, 174 D.L.R. (4th) 193 [Baker] and Director of Investigation and
Research, Competition Act v. Southam Inc. (No. 2) [1997] 1 S.C.R. 748, (1996), 144 D.L.R. (4th) 1,
209 N.R. 20, 71 C.P.R. (3d) 417, [1996] S.C.J. No. 116, online: QL (S.C.C.) [Southam Inc. (No. 2)].
10. Ibid. at para. 36.
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This pragmatic and functional approach creates a spectrum of levels of deference that
may be required: correctness, reasonableness simpliciter, and patent unreasonable-
ness.II As Bastarache J. stated in Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration): 12
Traditionally, the 'correctness" standard and the "patent unreasonableness" stan-
dard were the only two approaches available to a reviewing court. But in [Southam]
a "reasonableness simpliciter" standard was applied as the most accurate reflection
of the competence intended to be conferred on the tribunal by the legislator. Indeed,
the Court there described the range of standards available as a "spectrum" with a
"more exacting end" and a "more deferential end".
There are four main factors, each not conclusive in and of itself, that must be
considered in determining the proper standard of review for a decision from an
administrative tribunal: 13
1. the nature of the problem under review, and whether it constitutes a question
of law, fact or mixed law and fact; 14
2. words within the tribunal's enabling statute, most importantly, whether a
privative clause' 5 is present or absent; 16
3. the purpose of the tribunal's enabling statute, and whether that purpose lends
itself to less or more deference; and,
4. whether the tribunal has any particular expertise in reference to the question
under review.
In determining the appropriate standard of review, the court's focus must be on the
particular provision being invoked and interpreted by a tribunal. Some provisions within
the same legislation may require greater deference than others. 17 Until fairly recently, the
presence of a privative clause invoked a different sort of analysis by the courts, at least
11. The classic statement of the "patently unreasonable" standard is in Dickson J.'s judgment in the
seminal Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 963 v. New Brunswick Liquor Corp. (1979). 97
D.L.R. (3d) 417 (S.C.C.): Was the Board's interpretation so patently unreasonable that its construc-
tion could not be rationally supported by the relevant legislation and demanded intervention by the
court upon review?
12. Supra note 10 at para. 27, referring to Southain Inc. (No. 2). supra note 10 at para. 30.
13. See Moreau-Berube, supra note 10 at para. 39.
14. This is stated differently in Moreau-Bgrube, supra note 10, than it had been in Southamn Ltd. (No. 2).
supra at note 10. In Southam Inc. (No. 2) at S.C.R. para. 32 the "nature of the problem- was simply
whether the question was one of fact. mixed fact and law or law alone. The Moreau-Berube "nature
of the problem" test suggests there is a further consideration, perhaps, for example whether the
question is jurisdictional, constitutional, one of statutory interpretation, the exercise of discretion, or
natural justice. I suggest the test in Moreau-Berube should be limited to judicial review, whereas the
test in Southan Inc. (No. 2) is more appropriate to a statutory appeal.
15. A privative clause is a clause in a statute that purports to prevent the courts from reviewing decisions
made by a particular tribunal.
16. It is not so much whether a privative clause is present in the statute, but whether, if it is there, it
impacts on the type of review in question.
17. Pushpanathan, supra note 10 at N.R. 220.
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with respect to statutory interpretation matters. Typically, the courts held that they could
only intervene where there was a privative clause if the tribunal had exceeded or lost its
jurisdiction. A tribunal decision would be subject to judicial review if it erred in interpre-
ting a "jurisdictional" provision, or if it made a "patently unreasonable" 18 error of law on
a matter initially within its jurisdiction on the basis that a patently unreasonable interpre-
tation would cause the tribunal to lose its jurisdiction.
The expertise of the tribunal has been described as the most important of all the factors
that a court must consider in arriving at the appropriate standard of review. A tribunal
whose members are required to have a particular expertise or highly specialized knowl-
edge is likely to receive a high degree of deference from a reviewing court. Although there
may perhaps be an argument that the ORHT has some expertise with respect to policy
concerns, it is by nature an adjudicative rather than policy-making tribunal. It should not
be viewed as a "specialized" tribunal entitled to broad judicial deference. Indeed the
Supreme Court has held that a similar tribunal to the ORHT under a similar statute to the
TPA was not an expert tribunal. 19 The Court found that the former Ontario Residential
Tenancies Commission was not a specialized tribunal and therefore was not entitled to
broad curial deference. The reason for this conclusion was 1) there was no requirement
that its members have legal training or occupational experience and 2) the process of
selection of members was not based on any bipartite or tripartite principle. 20 The same
finding should apply to the ORHT.
It appears clear that a tribunal's interpretation of a provision limiting its own jurisdic-
tion should be accorded little or no deference, and should normally be reviewed on
the standard of correctness. 2 1 The Ontario Court of Appeal has suggested that the
correctness standard should apply to any statutory interpretation undertaken by a
non-expert tribunal. 22 Other errors of law, such as errors in the assessment of evi-
dence, 23 may be subject to a more relaxed standard of review. 2 4 However, this
possibility would only further reduce certainty and there is no sound reason why a
18. Supra note 12.
19. Reference Re Residential Tenancies Act, 1979, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 714 at 748. 123 D.L.R. (3d) 554, 37
N.R. 158 (S.C.C.).
20. Ibid. at S.C.R. 748.
21. Pezin v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Brokers) (1994), 168 N.R. 321 (S.C.C.).
22. Wedekind v. Director of Income Maintenance Branch of the Ministry of Community and Social
Services (1993), 62 O.A.C. 70 (Div Ct.), aff'd (1994), 21 O.R. (3d) 289 (C.A.), leave to appeal
refused (1995), 23 O.R. (3d) ii (S.C.C.). See also Matthews-Clarke v. Ontario (Director. Disability
Support Program) (12 February 2002), Court File No. 546/00 (Ont. Div. Ct.) (Farley, McCombs and
Sedgwick JJ.); Sampson v. Ontario (Director, Disability Support Program) (12 February 2002),
Court File No. 547/00 (Ont. Div. Ct.) (Farley, McCombs and Sedgwick JJ.). These were statutory
appeals. None of these decisions analyze the standard of review generally and so they do not stand
for anything other than that the tribunals had to be correct in interpreting the respective statutes.
They do not suggest that there is another standard of review on different sorts of errors of law.
23. E.g., consideration of irrelevant evidence, refusal to admit relevant evidence, decision based on no
evidence etc.
24. The author has found no jurisprudence to support this proposition in the context of a statutory appeal
on questions of law alone.
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non-expert tribunal should be permitted to make any errors in law. It remains safe to
say that issues involving the application or interpretation of the Charter 25 will always
be reviewed on a standard of correctness.
26
It is more difficult to predict what standard the Divisional Court is likely to apply in
reviewing errors involving natural justice. Such errors are consistently described in
the jurisprudence as errors that cause a tribunal to exceed or lose its jurisdiction. It
may be argued that once a tribunal is found to have exceeded its jurisdiction by
breaching natural justice, the decision which it has made is void and the reviewing
court must intervene, subject to its residual discretion to deny r~lief.27
Currently, therefore, there seems to be one test regarding the standard of review which
has evolved. This test is applicable whether or not that review is by way of statutory
appeal or by way of judicial review. While the test 28 is the same, the result is not
necessarily the same. For this reason I will address the standard applicable to appeals
and the standard applicable to judicial review separately.
APPEALS FROM DECISIONS OF THE TRIBUNAL
Appeals from decisions of the Tribunal are to the Ontario Divisional Court. Appeals
are as a matter of right: however they can be brought on questions of law alone.
29
What is a "question of law" is not always easily determinable. 30 An error ofjurisdiction
may be considered a species of error of law. 3 1
25- Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to
the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982. c. 11
26. Cuddv Chicks Ltd. v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board) (1991). 81 D.L.R. (4th) 121 (S.C.C.):
Ontario (Attorney General) v. Pvke (1998). 115 O.A.C. 162 (Div. Ct.) at 168.
27. In Cardinal v. Kent Institution, [ 19851 2 S.C.R. 643 at 661. Le Dain J. stated that the denial of a right
to a fair hearing must always render a decision invalid.
28. Perhaps more appropriately, one should say that the factors to be considered in determining the
standard of review are the same.
29. TPA s. 196(1). An appeal must be filed within 30 days after the order is served on the person who is
appealing. An appeal is not limited to parties but may be brought by any person "affected by the order".
30. E.g., in Hung v. C.L.K. Enterprises Ihc., [1999] O.J. No. 3559. online: QL (Div. Ct.). the Divisional
Court characterized a particular exercise of discretion by the ORHT to grant relief from torfeiture as an
error of law. This decision is at odds with the usual position of the appellate courts: see for example Peel
Non-Profit Housing v. McNamara (1991), 2 OR. (3d) 414 (Div. Ct.) in which the Court declined to
interfere even though it would have reached a different conclusion from the trial judge concerning the
exercise of discretion. In Hung. above, there was no evidence the Tribunal applied a wrong principle in
granting the relief. The Court assessed the facts differently, that was all. In Meredith v. LeboeufProperties
hic., [20001 O.J. No. 209, online: QL (Div. Ct.). the Court applied the "question of law" determination
very strictly. The tenant alleged the Tribunal erred in failing to exercise its mandatory authority to refuse
the eviction under TPA ss. 84(2)(a) where the landlord was in serious breach of its obligations under the
Act. The Divisional Court denied the appeal because it did not involve a question of law alone but
included an assessment of the facts. In Hasan v. Niagara Housing Authorit, (5 February 2001), Court
File No. 99-002412-DV (Ont. Div. Ct.), the Divisional Court held there was an error of law where
the Tribunal reached an unreasonable conclusion based on the evidence before it.
31. Quebec (Attorney General) v. Farrah, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 638 per Pigeon J.
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Although there is some disagreement, it seems that "a question of law" does not
include "a question of mixed fact and law". 32 It certainly does not include "a question
of fact alone". Under the LTA, appeals were not restricted to questions of law. 33
However, rarely did the Divisional Court interfere with strictly factual determinations.
It seems therefore, the legislature did intend in some respects to limit resort to the
appellate courts under the TPA from what had been the case under the LTA. The appeal
right is also arguably made broader under the TPA. 34 The limiting of appeals to
questions of law does not in itself mean the scope of review for those issues which are
properly the subject of appeal under TPA s. 196 was intended to be narrow.
THE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW FROM DECISIONS OF ORHT
While there is one test for determining the standard of review, there is no set standard
applicable to all tribunals in all situations or contexts. The analysis of the standard of
review on statutory appeals, however, is subject to the same general common law
principles as on judicial review.
The Divisional Court jurisprudence on the standard of review from ORHT decisions
is diverse and leaves a lot to be desired in terms of legal analysis. In most cases there
is no analysis at all. In some cases it is muddled. To date, the Court has established
three distinct standards for ORHT appeals: corrrectness, 35 reasonableness simplici-
ter 36 and patent unreasonableness. 37 The decisions cover the whole spectrum of
possible standards identified to date by the Supreme Court of Canada.
32. E.g., Meredith v. Leboeuf Properties Inc., [2000] O.J. No. 209: online: QL (Div. Ct.).
33. LTA, s. 116.
34 Under the LTA, s. 116, an appeal was only from "final orders". Under the TPA, s. 196, an appeal is not
limited to final orders, although rarely will an appeal be entertained from interim or interlocutory orders:
Tenants of 22 Shalimar v. Lt. Greenwin (23 August 1999) Court File No. 534/99 (Ont. Div. Ct.).
35. Hung v. C.L.K Enterprises Inc., [19991 O.J. No. 3559. on line: QL (Div. Ct.), Belleau v. Victoria
Park Comnunity Homes (8 February 2000), Court File No. 99-1867-DV (Ont. Div. Ct.) (O'Driscoll,
McNeely and Matlow Ji.), Dollitnore v. Azuria Group Inc., [2001] O.J. No. 4408, online: QL (Div.
Ct.) (McRae, Day and Caputo JJ.) and (at least arguably although it is not clearly stated in these
terms) 4750, 4752, 4754 Dundas Street West (Tenants of) v. Wuebbolt. [2001] O.J. No. 4001, online:
QL (Div. Ct.) (Then, Cosgrove and Cameron JJ.).
36. Paul Bunyan Trailer Camp Limited v. McCormick (29 October 1999), Court File No. 1005/98 (Ont.
Div. Ct.); Burt Dozet Management Inc. v. Goharzad. [2001] O.J. No. 550, online: QL (Div. Ct.)
(Killeen, Pardu and Cavarzan JJ.) (on consent on this issue): and MacKay v. Sanghera, [20011 O.J.
No. 2600, online: QL (Div. Ct.) (Lane, Then and Chapnik JJ.) (although Court also held that decision
was correct). There is a possibility. from reading the decision in Paul Bunyan Trailer Camp Limited
v. McCormick, supra, that the Court was focused on the notion that this was an issue of mixed fact
and law and, therefore, that a lower standard should apply. However, if the question for consider-
ation on appeal was one of mixed fact and law, then the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the
appeal at all.
37. Sinolcec v. Longhouse Village (Thunder Bayx) Inc. (2001). 32 Admin. L.R. (3d) 72, 143 O.A.C. 137
(Ont. Div. Ct.) (LaForme, Greer and Ferguson JJ.), leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal refused, 19
July 2001 (Catzman, Feldman, Sharpe JJ.A.).
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In Director of Investigation and Research, Competition Act v. Southam Inc. (No. 2)38
[Southam Inc. (No. 2)1, lacobucci J. held that appellate courts must have regard to 1)
the nature of the problem, 2) to the applicable law properly interpreted in light of the
purpose, and 3) to the expertise of the tribunal in question. 39 Iacobucci J. said the
"nature of the problem" referred to whether the issue was one of law, fact or mixed
fact and law. He determined that courts should show more deference to a tribunal on
questions of fact or mixed fact and law than on questions of law alone. 40 Further, where
the purpose of the legislation was to establish a tribunal with non-legal or not strictly
legal expertise, 4' the natural inference was that the purpose of the Act was better
served by appellate deference to the tribunal's decisions.
The Divisional Court in Paul Bunyan Trailer Camp Limited v. McCormick42 held that
the Tribunal was an expert tribunal which should be accorded deference. As such it
applied a "reasonableness" standard. The Court did not appear to examine in detail
whether, in fact, the Tribunal was comprised of persons with expertise, 4 3 but rather
merely stated that the Tribunal was established "presumably because the government
of Ontario believed this task could be handled more effectively and efficiently by a
panel of lay persons with expertise in this field" (at para. 21). If this was the sole basis
for the Court's finding, then I would suggest that it has taken the Supreme Court's
decision in Southam Inc. [No. 2] 4 4 out of context. The statement about expertise by
lacobucci J. was not saying that amateur tribunals should be accorded more deference.
Given the context of the Supreme Court decision, 4 5 it appears that the point Iacobucci
J. was making was that tribunals that may not have legal knowledge but have other
proven specialized expertise 46 applicable to the legislation in question should be
38. Supra note 10. This is the leading decision with respect to the standard of review in an appeal from a
decision of an administrative tribunal. Practically all Supreme Court of Canada cases have dealt with
judicial review proceedings.
39. It can be assumed that for statutory appeals. there is no governing privative clause. Therefore the
fourth factor identified earlier in this paper (and which is certainly relevant to judicial review), i.e.,
whether there is a privative clause, need not be listed. However, that does not mean it need not be
considered. The absence of a privative clause is one factor in favour of a less deferential standard of
review in appeals.
40. Appeals from ORHT are on questions of law alone and this suggests that OR HT should be accorded
the least deference under this factor.
41. The TPA demonstrates no purpose to have an expert tribunal of legal or non-legal specialized
knowledge: i.e., ORHT is not an "expert- tribunal in the sense that term is used by the Supreme
Court.
42. Supra note 35.
43. There is absolutely no justification for holding the Tribunal to be an expert tribunal. Three of five
Vice-Chairs are not lawyers. Of the full time Members, over 50% have no legal training. Very few
have any demonstrable expertise in landlord and tenant law and of those, few, if any, appear to be
knowledgeable about the common law of landlord and tenant. A handful have had administrative
rent control experience. Indeed, when the Tribunal was first hiring adjudicators, it developed strict
conflict of interest guidelines and looked for those without recent special experience in this field.
44. Supra note 10.
45. This was an appeal from a tribunal composed of economic. commercial and legal experts.
46. E.g.. economic, commercial, etc.
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accorded deference. In Southain (No. 2),47 Iacobucci J. even suggested that a consid-
eration of the "patent unreasonableness" standard does not usually factor into statutory
appeals .48
An important recent decision of the Divisional Court on the standard of review
generally is Coughlan v. WMC International Ltd.49 The decision dealt with the Ontario
Securities Commission [OSC] and the right of appeal under the Securities Act.50 The
Act provided a broad right of appeal unimpeded by a privative clause which, as the
Court noted, 5 1 dictated against the standard of "patent unreasonableness". Moreover,
the appeal, unlike appeals from ORHT, was not limited to questions of law alone. The
Court on appeal from the OSC could entertain three types of questions; namely, law,
fact and mixed law and fact. This brought into play a possible application of a spectrum
of standards depending on the nature of the issue under appeal. The Court also noted
that the appeal provision in question, although broad, did not expressly give the Court
the authority to substitute its opinion for that of the Tribunal. 5 2 Moreover, as was noted
by the Divisional Court, the tribunal in question was a:
highly specialized tribunal with expertise in the regulation of capital markets. The
complexity of the securities markets and the extent to which the OSC must balance
competing interests while at the same time protecting the public interest... 53
Even where a standard of patent unreasonableness would be suggested by the
tribunal's "highly specialized expertise", the Divisional Court held that this must be
re-evaluated in light of the particular issue before the tribunal "and the court's own
relative expertise on that issue... ''54
Applying this decision's analysis of the applicable Supreme Court of Canadajurispru-
dence suggests strongly that the proper standard on appeal from ORHT under s. 196
of the TPA is one of "correctness". In any event is most certainly not one of "patent
unreasonableness" for the following reasons:
1. Subsections 196(1), (4) and (5) together provide a very broad right of appeal.
2. The court is given the power to substitute its decision for that of the Tribunal. 55
47. Supra note 10.
48. In Southamn Inc. (No. 2), ibid., Justice lacobucci stated that because the standard of patent
unreasonableness was principally a test for determining whether a tribunal had exceeded its jurisdic-
tion, it would rarely be the appropriate standard of review in statutory appeals. In any event, he
considered all the factors and especially the highly specialized expertise of the tribunal in this case.
49. [20001 O.J. No. 5109, online: QL (Div. Ct.) (McRae, Somers, Molloy, JJ.).
50 R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, s. 9.
51 Coughlan v. WMC International Ltd., supra note 50 at para. 25.
52. Coughlan v. WMC International Ltd., supra at note 50 at para 25.
53 Ibid. at para. 27. Emphasis added.
54, Op. Sit. at para. 28.
55. Although the term used is "replace" not "substitute": s. 196(4)(a).
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3. While TPA has a privative clause 56 applicable in judicial review applications,
it is expressly made subject to the right of appeal by the opening phrase. 57
Therefore, it is not a clause governing appeals under s. 196.
4. There is no room for the application of a spectrum of standards to decisions
of the ORHT as an appeal under s. 196 is limited to questions of law alone.58
5. Even if it could be said the ORHT were a "specialized tribunal", 59 it most
certainly is not a "highly specialized tribunal" in the context of the OSC and
similar expert tribunals.
6. Questions relating to tenancy contracts and the general law of landlord and
tenant relationships are within the courts' developed expertise.
Further, an appellate court from the trial decisions under the LTA exercised a standard
of correctness with respect to issues of law.60 There is no justification for finding that
a non-expert tribunal should be accorded a greater degree of deference under the TPA.
Indeed, if the standard is reasonableness alone, then appeal decisions affirming a
Tribunal decision can only stand for the proposition that a Tribunal decision was
reasonable. They would not mean that it was correct. Therefore, appeal decisions can
have no binding precedential standing on the interpretation of the TPA. This view is
supported by Essex County Roman Catholic School Board v. Ontario English Catholic
Teachers'Association.6 1 Any adjudicator could make another equally reasonable but
opposite determination on the same point of interpretation. While this may be accept-
able in some areas of administrative law, it is not acceptable in something as important
as housing. It would lead to chaos, uncertainty and, most definitely, to inequity. Rather
than discourage litigation, it would promote it.
56. S. 195.
57. TPA, s. 195 states: "Except where this Act provides otherwise, an order of the Tribunal is final,
binding and not subject to review except under section 21.2 of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act."
[Emphasis added.] Section 196 provides otherwise.
58. Some might argue that even different types of questions of law might be subject to a spectrum within
the spectrum. However, the author can see no justification for this and finds no jurisprudence to
support that argument in the context of a statutory appeal on a question of law alone.
59. The author strongly disputes this premise. See discussion of Reference Re Residential Tenancies Act,
1979, supra note 20.
60. This was not addressed head on; but is implied from the decisions: e.g., Re Coadv-Mark and 938155
Ontario Ltd. (24 July 1996). Hamilton File No. L4751/96 (Ont. Gen. Div.); aff'd (10 September
1997) File No. D752/96 (Ont. Div. Ct.) [unreported]; Manufacturers Life Property Corp. v. Senkow
(1990), 75 O.R. (2d) 254 (Div. Ct.); Nicholson v. Michalas (1988), 64 O.R. (2d) 238 (Div. Ct.); Re
Kalezic and Maddix (13 May 1987), #M147057/87 (Ont. Dist. Ct.): aff'd (17 June 1987) (Div. Ct.)
[unreported]: Greenwin Property Management v. McCormick (1982), 36 O.R. (2d) 161 (Div. Ct.);
Ozmond v. Young (1980), 28 O.R. (2d) 225 (Div. Ct.); Re Hahn and Kramer (1979), 23 OR. (2d)
689 (Div. Ct.); Re Oshawa Housing Authority and Maule (12 March 1979), (Ont. Div. Ct.) [unre-
ported]. Discretionary decisions, and decisions of fact were accorded more deference.
61. (2001), 56 O.R. (3d) 85 (C.A.) (Borins, Feldman, MacPherson JJ.A.). This was an appeal from a
judicial review of a decision of an arbitrator. The Court of Appeal enunciated the issue under appeal
as being the role of consistency in the decisions of arbitrators and administrative tribunals and the
relationship of the courts to those decisions. The Court determined that only decisions of the review-
ing courts determined on a "correctness" standard where binding precedents.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW ON JUDICIAL REVIEW FROM ORHT
This is not intended to be an exhaustive discussion of judicial review. 62 There are very
few judicial review decisions from ORHT.63 This is most likely because of the
existence of a statutory right of appeal under s. 196 of the TPA. While the existence
of an appeal right is not fatal to an application for judicial review, 64 judicial review is
a discretionary remedy. The appeal right would in many situations weigh against the
exercise of that discretion in favour of an applicant.
While there is no privative clause governing appeals under the TPA, there is a privative
clause governing other types of court review. Section 195 states:
Except where this Act provides otherwise, an order of the Tribunal is final, binding
and not subject to review except under section 21.2 of the Statutory Powers Proce-
dure Act.6 5
The wording of privative clauses varies, and different types of clauses have been
interpreted differently. No matter how strict the language, however, the courts have
refused to accept that any privative clause can entirely deprive them of supervisory
jurisdiction over tribunal decisions. According to the latest decisions by the Supreme
Court of Canada, the presence of a "full" privative clause indicates that the court ought
to show deference to the tribunal's decision, unless other factors strongly indicate the
contrary. 66 By any means, s. 195 is not a "full" privative clause. 67 Regardless s. 195
does demonstrate an intention by the legislature that some deference on judicial review
be given to the Tribunal, at least where the Tribunal is acting within its jurisdiction.
In Metropolitan Toronto Housing Authority v. Godwin,6 8 the Divisional Court has held
that the appropriate standard of review on judicial review was "correctness '" 69 given
62. Nor is it intended to be an examination of when judicial review might be more appropriate than appeal.
63. The author is only aware of the following two proceedings: Metropolitan Toronto Housing Authority
v. Godwin (2000), 50 O.R. (3d) 207 (Div. Ct.) (O'Driscoll J.), leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal
granted 19 July 2001, (Catzman, Feldman, Sharpe IJ.A.); and Santokie v. Toronto Housing Co.,
[2001] O.J. No. 30, online: QL (Div. Ct.) (O'Driscoll, Southey and O'Connor JJ.).
64. The Judicial Review Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. 1.1, [JRPA] s. 2(1) expressly states that an
application may be made despite the existence of a right of appeal.
65. Section 21.2 of the SPPA governs review by the Tribunal itself. I will address this issue briefly later
in this paper.
66. A "full" privative clause is one that states that decisions of the tribunal are "final and conclusive
from which no appeal lies and all forms of judicial review are excluded": Pasiechnyk v. Procrane
(1997), 216 N.R. 1 at 15 (S.CC.).
67. An example of a "full" privative clause is found in the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, 1997,
S.O. 1997, c. 16, Sch. A, s. 86(3). This provides that "... the order or direction of the Appeals
Tribunal or a panel thereof is final and conclusive and not open to question or review in any court
upon any grounds and no proceeding by or before the Appeals Tribunal or a panel thereof shall be
restrained by injunction, prohibition or other process or procedure in any court or be removable by
application for judicial review, or otherwise, into any court." There is no statutory right of appeal in
this statute.
68. Supra note 64.
69. In the alternative, the Court held that the decision of the Tribunal to proceed to hear evidence on a
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that this was a jurisdictional issue and involved a question of law.70 Certainly on other
questions, fact or mixed fact and law, the existence of a moderate privative clause
might suggest the application of a reasonableness simpliciter standard even if ORHT
is not an expert tribunal. Whereas appeals cannot be brought on factual questions or
on questions of mixed fact and law, judicial review may involve these questions.
Certainly, there is more scope for considering a broad spectrum of standards of review
depending on the particular issue being considered by the court.
INTERNAL REVIEW OF ORHT DECISIONS
Internal review of ORHT decisions is authorized by the SPPA, 7 1 the TPA72 and the
ORHT Rules of Practice. 7 3 The SPPA s. 21.2(1) states:
A tribunal may, if it considers it advisable and if its rules made under section 25.1
deal with the matter, review all or part of its own decision or order, and may
confirm, vary, suspend or cancel the decision or order.
The ORHT will only review final orders. The SPPA makes no reference to any
restriction on reviews of final orders. ORHT Rule 27.1, however, purports to restrict
reviews to orders which "finally dispose of an application". This Rule is more
restrictive than the SPPA provision requires; however, since the ORHT could have
declined to develop any Rule, presumably a restrictive Rule is authorized. 74
The power of review is discretionary. A request to review an order will not be allowed
unless a Member of the Tribunal determines that the order may contain a "serious
error" or that a serious error occurred in the proceedings. 75 A description of what is a
serious error is contained in the Tribunal's guideline entitled "Review of an Order". 76
This guideline states:
Since a party cannot appeal an order to the Divisional Court, except on a point
of law, it is important that the Tribunal review alleged errors of fact. However,
the Tribunal may decline to review an order if the alleged error is trivial in amount
or would not significantly change the result. This means that it is essential that the
representative basis was "patently unreasonable".
70. That is, whether the Act authorized the Tribunal to hear representative evidence. Both the Tribunal
and the tenant filed motions for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal. Leave was granted. The
matter appears to be on hold.
71. SPPA s. 21.2.
72. E.g., TPA, ss. 170, 195.
73. ORHT Rule 27, "Review of Orders".
74. In any event, rules may be waived: ORHT Rule 1.5. The Tribunal could entertain a review from an
interim order in an appropriate situation: e.g., see Godwin v. Metropolitan Toronto Housing Author-
i, (4 February 2000; Braund), File No. TST-01206-l-RV2 (ORHT), rev'd on other grounds at
(2000), 50 OR. (3d) 207 (Div. Ct.) (O'Driscoll J.).
75. ORHT Rule 27.2.
76. The Tribunal's Interpretation Guidelines are not binding on adjudicators: TPA, s. 164(3). The types
of errors contemplated by the Guidelines are errors of jurisdiction, procedural errors, errors of fact
and law and error in the application of discretion where the discretion was exercised unreasonably.
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party requesting the review should specify not only what the error is, but how it
would change the order if the Tribunal agrees it is an error. [Emphasis added.]
Yet this guideline is followed more in the breach than in the application. Indeed, the
Tribunal rarely reviews factual determinations and has established a standard of
review that is so deferential that review is often a pointless exercise.77 As long as there
has been no factual determination that was unsupported by evidence, the decision will
not be interfered with in most cases.78 One adjudicator has stated that, if the findings
of fact are not unreasonable or capricious, they will not be interfered with. 79 Another
has stated that a patently unreasonable interpretation of evidence or law is required
before a review should interfere with a decision. 80
The Tribunal adjudicators have a considerable degree of discretion. There is, for
example, discretion to grant relief from eviction; there is a degree of discretion in
determining what remedy is appropriate in a given case and there is a discretion to
impose conditions in an order. The Tribunal will not interfere with the "proper exercise
of discretion" even if the review adjudicator might have exercised the discretion
differently. 8' The Tribunal will not even normally review a reasonable interpretation
of the statute by an adjudicator even if it might not be correct. 82
Instead of being a broader right of review than an appeal, as suggested by the Tribunal
Guidelines, in practice internal reviews by the ORHT offer very narrow review
opportunities.
CONCLUSION
Only a correctness standard on appeal will offer the possibility for a degree of certainty
which should be accorded to residential tenancy jurisprudence. The ORHT is not an
expert lay tribunal in the sense that the Supreme Court of Canada has used that term.
It has no greater expertise over residential tenancy disputes than do the courts.
However, given the privative clause, which is applicable to judicial review, the best
opportunity for review of a decision of the ORHT remains an appeal in most cases.
This is unfortunate. Appeals are costly, procedurally complicated, slow to unfold and,
of course, are limited to questions of law. However, despite conflicting jurisprudence,
the standard of correctness is applicable in an appeal to errors of law by ORHT.
77. E.g., Kingston & Frontenac Housing Corporation v. Kaloudas (29 June 2001: Goodchild), File No.
EAL-21668-RV (ORHT).
78. Ibid.
79. Toronto Housing Company Inc. v. Hocek (24 July 2001; McGavin), File No. TNL-25818-RV
(ORHT).
80. Torres v. Minto Management Limited (29 June 2001; von Cramon), File No. EAT-02491-RV
(ORHT).
81. E.g., Metropolitan Toronto Housing Authority v. St. Louis (9 June 1999; Timms), File No. TEL-
02124-RV (ORHT). This standard of review is one applied by the courts on appeal.
82. ORHT Interpretation Guideline, "Review of an Order". In Fox v. Bond (16 June 2000; Rogers), File
No. TSL- 19462-RV (ORHT), for example, an interpretation of s. 71 was held to be reasonable and
therefore the review adjudicator would not interfere even though another interpretation was possible.
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Therefore, where an appeal is warranted, the courts should give a more careful
consideration to the decision of the Tribunal.
The power of ORHT to offer meaningful internal reviews could potentially limit the
resort to the courts. However, the Tribunal has, to a significant degree, curtailed
meaningful review. 83 The Tribunal applies a reasonable standard to review of its
decisions even on questions of law.
Judicial review will rarely be the best way in which to proceed, although the possibility
of getting to court quickly does exist. 84 It is a discretionary remedy and is as
complicated procedurally as are appeals. It is also likely that, in judicial review, that
a moderate degree of deference will be accorded to decisions of ORHT, at least on
questions not involving the Tribunal's jurisdiction.
83. This is not to say there are no examples of good internal review decisions by ORHT. Good decisions
are usually found in egregious cases, where there has been a glaring breach of natural justice, or a
blatant error of law, including error of jurisdiction.
84. Judicial Review Procedure Act, s. 6(2) supra note 65.

